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Abstract: We report a retrospective analysis of 84 consecutive pediatrics-related internal review 
ﬁ  les opened by a medical center’s risk managers between 1996 and 2001. The aims were to 
identify common causative factors associated with adverse events/adverse outcomes (AEs) in a 
Pediatrics Department, then suggest ways to improve care. The main outcome was identiﬁ  cation 
of any patterns of factors that contributed to AEs so that interventions could be designed to 
address them. Cases were noted to have at least one apparent contributing problem; the most 
common were with communication (44% of cases), diagnosis and treatment (37%), medication 
errors (20%), and IV/Central line issues (17%). 45% of ﬁ  les involved a child with an underlying 
diagnosis putting her/him at high risk for an adverse outcome. All Pediatrics Departments face 
multiple challenges in assuring consistent quality care. The extent to which the data generalize to 
other institutions is unknown. However, the data suggest that systematic analysis of aggregated 
claims ﬁ  les may help identify and drive opportunities for improvement in care.
Keywords: adverse event, medical error, patient safety, pediatrics, risk management, quality 
improvement
Introduction
Providing quality care for children and reducing malpractice risks have long been goals 
of pediatricians, medical centers, and their insurers. Identifying the etiology(ies) of 
serious medical events is an important ﬁ  rst step toward those goals. Various methods, 
including patient chart audits, satisfaction surveys, audits of unsolicited complaints, ac-
creditation/certiﬁ  cation evaluations, and morbidity/mortality reviews have been used in 
attempts to understand the drivers underlying malpractice claims (Luft and Hunt 1986; 
Hall and Dornan 1988; Berwick 1989; Brennan et al 1990; Hickson et al 2002).
Systematic reviews of risk management claim files have proved useful for 
identifying common causes of alleged adverse outcomes or threatened litigation that 
prompted risk management activity on behalf of pediatricians (Pichert et al 1997). 
The study described herein was designed to 1) conduct a more targeted analysis of a 
risk management database to identify common causes of pediatrics-related adverse 
events (AEs) at an academic medical center (AMC), and 2) identify any characteristics 
that may increase risk for serious medical events and litigation involving children. 
We conclude by identifying ways in which these data have been employed to drive 
organizational improvements.
Method
Study design
This study was a structured retrospective analysis of consecutive risk management 
records from a single institution.Therapeutics and Clinical Risk Management 2007:3(4) 626
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Study population and setting
All patients were treated in an urban academic Department 
of Pediatrics. For perspective, annual clinical activity during 
the study period included approximately 820,000 pediatric 
encounters (inpatient and outpatient). Care was provided by 
attending physicians, residents, and medical students. All 
care is supervised by an attending physician.
Data
The source of the raw data for this project included 116 inter-
nal review ﬁ  les opened by the Ofﬁ  ce of Risk Management at 
the AMC. The target ﬁ  les met several criteria: (a) they were 
opened from 1996 through 2001; (b) cases were limited to 
those involving children less than 21 years of age at the time 
the risk management ﬁ  le was opened; (c) care was provided 
by the insured medical center’s physicians, hospitals, and/or 
clinics; and (d) more than three years had passed since the 
incident or outcome of concern without any indication that 
a malpractice claim might be pursued, the claim had been 
dropped, resolved or settled out of court, or the courts had 
dismissed or rendered judgment regarding the claim.
Routine risk management review process
Table 1 depicts the sequence by which these cases were 
identiﬁ  ed and analyzed. The AMC’s routine risk management 
process is initiated upon receiving a patient/family member’s 
allegation of an AE, a formal (incident) report or informal 
report of an AE from a staff member, or an inquiry from an 
attorney. All reports are screened. Files are opened only in 
cases judged by risk managers to represent potential liability 
or potential need to defend threatened claims. Well trained 
and experienced risk management claims investigators 
conduct interviews with staff associated with the case; obtain 
complete medical records as needed, then review and copy 
relevant portions for the ﬁ  le; meet with expert consultants 
as needed; and prepare summaries for subsequent review by 
a committee of physician/nurse/administrative leaders. As a 
result, ﬁ  les contain a copy of all relevant medical records, 
summaries of any interviews with the personnel involved, 
expert medical and legal opinions, and any other material 
pertinent to the event. The risk managers participating in 
this project have an excellent history of fully investigating 
AEs and identifying events that could lead to lawsuits. 
Over the previous ten years, fewer than 2% of claims had 
not been anticipated. In other words, cases are well-vetted 
and documented prior to the reviews described below for 
purposes of this study.
Project-speciﬁ  c measurement process
Case ﬁ  les were distributed to and initially evaluated by 
individual members of a team that included two nurses 
employed full time in risk management and trained as risk 
management claims investigators, three ﬁ  rst year medical 
students, a Ph.D. researcher, and a pediatrician reviewer 
(PH). All but the physician served as “primary screener” 
for a number of cases, a process employed in similar studies 
(Pichert et al 1997; White et al 2004; White et al 2005). The 
person serving as primary screener for a case identiﬁ  ed all 
actions, events, and environmental circumstances that risk 
management’s expert reviews suggested had potentially 
contributed to the event. The screener also looked at each 
case for other potential deviations from standard care. So, for 
example, when trainees were involved in a child’s care, one 
question was whether the ﬁ  le indicated that they had been 
adequately supervised. When essential medications were 
prescribed, the reviewers assessed whether they were deliv-
ered as ordered. Similar questions were asked with respect 
to the timeliness and accuracy of critical tests and ﬁ  lms. In 
other words, screeners were not only to identify probable 
causes of AEs highlighted by the risk managers’ reviews, 
but they were also challenged to ask whether risk managers 
had considered other case-relevant factors that could have 
contributed to the AE. All participants signed a strict pledge 
of conﬁ  dentiality.
Screeners created “cause-and-effect diagrams” (also 
called Ishikawa or “fishbone” diagrams) for each case 
to depict relationships between an AE and its apparent 
Table 1 Sequence of events in this project
Routine Risk Management Processes
  1. Occurrence of adverse event or potential adverse event.
  2. Adverse event reported to Risk Management Ofﬁ  ce.
 3.    Risk Manager evaluates the event and opens a case review ﬁ  le if 
potential liability is identiﬁ  ed or legal action threatened.
 4.    Risk Manager populates the ﬁ  le with case-related materials, 
including pertinent medical records, summaries of interviews 
with physicians and staff, expert reviews and other case-related 
documents relevant for decision-making.
Subsequent Project-Speciﬁ  c Processes
 5.    All cases associated with the Department of Pediatrics are 
distributed randomly to members of a multidisciplinary review 
group, each of whom is the primary analyst.
 6.    Primary reviewers present case and analysis to multidisciplinary 
review group.
 7.    Review group achieves consensus about likely cause(s) of each 
alleged adverse event or evaluates additional case information 
until consensus is achieved.Therapeutics and Clinical Risk Management 2007:3(4) 627
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contributing factors (Ishikawa 1982). Figure 1 illustrates a 
ﬁ  shbone diagram of a ﬁ  ctitious case composed of elements 
drawn from many cases. In brief, a 6 month old female 
weighing 15.5 pounds was admitted to the wards with a 
diagnosis of seizures. Having mistakenly read the recorded 
weight as kilograms, the house ofﬁ  cer on call ordered 310 mg 
(20 mg/kg) of phenobarbital as a loading dose. The admitting 
team then went off-call and left the hospital. The nurse noted 
that the dose seemed high and called the covering intern. The 
nurse was told, “Loading doses are supposed to be high.” The 
dose was given and the patient had a respiratory arrest.
The methods for coding such a case have been previously 
described (Pichert et al 1997). The primary screener assigned 
codes to the apparent contributing causes from a list of 
120 descriptions (Harvard Risk Management Foundation, 
Malpractice claims description codes [unpublished]). For 
example, if risk management’s review suggested that a 
physician failed to educate a parent about signs of a child’s 
post-operative complication, and this led to delayed care, the 
code for “Inadequate discharge instruction” from the general 
category of communication-related items was assigned to 
the case. As many codes as needed were assigned to each 
case in order to capture all contributing factors associated 
with the alleged AE. Given the quality and detail of the risk 
managers’ case reviews and summaries, medical students 
and other nonmedical personnel have proved competent as 
screeners in previous studies. (Pichert et al 1997; Morris et al 
2003; White et al 2004, 2005).
Primary case screeners presented their analysis to the 
rest of the review team. The team met to consider each 
ﬁ  le together, challenging the primary screener to support 
the code assignments and offering alternate explanations 
until the team reached a consensus. Disputes were resolved 
by applying precedents established in previous projects, 
Figure 1 A hypothetical 6 month old female weighing 15 1/2 pounds was admitted with a diagnosis of seizures.  The cause-and-effect diagram depicts aspects of her care 
and the adverse outcome following a medication error.  Risk management code categories are bolded in the diagram. The elements of the case are as follows:
RS, a 6 month-old healthy female, was admitted to the hospital with new onset seizures.  An intern was instructed by an attending neurologist, Dr. Neurologist, to administer 20 mg/kg of 
phenobarbital.  The intern noted the weight from the ED triage sheet (recorded as 15.5 kg) and ordered 310 mg of phenobarbital IV.  An error message was generated by the computer 
order entry system, but was overridden by the intern (error messages are always given for loading doses - the system was programmed to check maintenance doses only). Because the 
on-call period was ending, the intern checked out to the new on-call team.  Shortly after the new shift began, RS’s nurse received the loading dose from the pharmacy and was concerned 
by the amount (310 mgs).  She saw the covering intern ﬁ  nishing a note and said “sure is a large dose of phenobarbital for such a small child.” The intern replied, “Loading doses are 
supposed to be large; the parents have already complained to me about the delay.  Get the drug in — NOW.  I am NOT answering to a d*** nurse.” The phenobarbital was given and 
RS stopped breathing.  A general code was called.  No ambu bag was found in the room, so another intern began mouth to mouth resuscitation.  The parents witnessed the event. RS was 
intubated and transferred to the PICU, where her parents insisted on accompanying her.  A staff member refused them entry, explaining that the PICU protocol did not allow parents to be 
admitted until the patient is stabilized.
Parents angry, untrusting;
wanted to accompany child
to PICU
    Policy: no parents
in PICU until pt
stabilized (Policy)
Respiratory arrest 
and delayed 
resuscitation
Procedures Equipment
People Environment Policies
Too much Phenobarbital: Intern gave overdose
      Dosing is 20 mg/kg; child’s weight was recorded in kg, but
measured in pounds, so dose was miscalculated (Documentation)
Computer error message for high dose was overridden
System always signals error for loading dose (Equipment)
   RN noted problem, questioned MD, failed to press the concern (Communication)
Covering MD ordered RN to proceed, RN did
                  Jousting: inappropriate reaction to RN questions (Communication)
      Parents complained about treatment delays starting with ED (Communication)
(Prescribing/dispensing)
4 Interns Involved: 1 ED, 1
on admit to floor, one with
new on call team, 1 on
resuscitation team
(Fragmentation of care)
MD was unprofessional toward RN & RN did not go
up Chain of Command (Communication)
  Not clear why
Resuscitation delayed: No ambu
bag in room (Equipment)
4 Interns Involved, but none recognized
(Supervision)
Parents were anxious, angry, complaining to MD
(Communication)
  Child seizing, then not breathing, not clear why,
      and no one talking to parents
the medication error
Child admitted to floor
from ED with new onset
seizures, given too much
PhenobarbitalTherapeutics and Clinical Risk Management 2007:3(4) 628
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including obtaining, analyzing, and coding additional 
information. Complete medical records were available for 
review, but copies of relevant portions were sufﬁ  cient for 
gaining consensus in all but six ﬁ  les where the review team 
wanted conﬁ  rmatory or contradictory information before 
deciding on a cause. In all six instances the complete record 
conﬁ  rmed the reviewers’ judgments based on the ﬁ  le sum-
maries. The physician reviewer (PH) did not assign codes, 
but clariﬁ  ed and arbitrated questions about technical and 
procedural issues.
The index of concordance between primary screeners’ 
initial code assignments and the ﬁ  nal consensus-based codes 
was 87% (number of agreements divided by number of agree-
ments plus disagreements), suggesting adequate initial coder 
training and general consistency among the judges. The codes 
that changed, however, reinforce the importance of multi-
disciplinary team reviews. Speciﬁ  cally, in our experience, 
judges’ varied backgrounds, professional training, perspec-
tives and inevitable biases promote revelation and evaluation 
of a case’s “entire picture.” Individual reviewers may focus 
on selected aspects of a case, but discount, overlook or not 
fully appreciate the signiﬁ  cance of others until reviewers 
with complementary expertise point them out. Traditional 
methods of determining “interrater reliability” do not apply 
when raters’ expertises vary so considerably as in multidis-
ciplinary case review teams. The team approach is essential 
to achieve comprehensive evaluations.
Data analysis
After stripping the data of identiﬁ  ers in order to preserve 
patient conﬁ  dentiality, codes for each case were collected 
in a spreadsheet (MS Excel®, Microsoft, Redmond, WA) 
and analyzed with descriptive statistics (frequency counts 
and proportions). We also recorded the patient’s reason for 
presentation. 
The Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board 
reviewed and approved this project on an exempt basis.
Results
Out of some 820,000 pediatric hospital discharges and ambu-
latory visits, 116 risk management ﬁ  les were opened, a rate 
of less than 0.2 ﬁ  le openings per 1,000 visits. After analyz-
ing the ﬁ  les, 84 (72%) were identiﬁ  ed that had both an AE 
(Table 2) and at least one potential causative issue related to 
that AE. The other 32 were opened for reasons not relevant 
to the analysis. For example, in one case judged irrelevant 
to this project, a referring medical center was sued about its 
care prior to a child’s transfer to the target institution. In this 
and similar instances the risk managers opened a ﬁ  le simply 
in order to deal with communications associated with that 
suit. Other examples of ﬁ  le openings not relevant to the 
analysis included such events as parents being reported to 
the State Department of Children’s Services for concerns 
about potential child abuse, a court-order for blood products 
administered to a child whose parents objected on religious 
grounds, known complications of surgery, previously exist-
ing conditions, and children who died of sudden infant death 
syndrome (SIDS). In several cases parents threatened to sue 
because they became angry about perceived failures of com-
munication between themselves and various care providers, 
but neither these communications nor any other problem 
appeared had any bearing on the care provided or the AE; 
ﬁ  les were opened simply to prepare a defense if the parents 
chose to pursue a claim. Overall, 32 cases were excluded 
from further analysis.
The ﬁ  rst goal was to learn the issues in the remaining 
cases that led to AEs and creation of a risk management ﬁ  le. 
The cases involved a range of outcomes that might have been 
avoided or ameliorated (Table 2). Of the 84 cases, several 
categories of potential causes of or contributors to the adverse 
event stood out (each ﬁ  le can have more than one code): 
Communication 44% (37 ﬁ  les), Diagnosis and Treatment 
37% (31 ﬁ  les), Medication Errors 20% (17 ﬁ  les), and IV or 
Central Line Issues 17% (14 ﬁ  les).
Table 2 Adverse outcomes associated with case ﬁ  les
Types of Adverse Outcomes  N of Cases
Death 20
Procedural/Surgical misadventure (eg, nicked aorta,
  patient left with a limp, instrument burns)   16
Prolongation of stay/course  14
Line Complication  11
Cardiac/Respiratory Arrest or Myocardial Infarction  6
Medication/Transfusion error (eg, erroneous
  administration of product resulting in adverse
  side effect or potential side effect requiring
 additional  monitoring)  5
Brain injury (one each: actual injury or potential
  injury due to hypoxia)  2
Hearing Loss  2
Signiﬁ  cant treatment delays that increased
  treatment challenges and risk of problems  2
Unplanned extubation (NG or Respiratory)
  requiring additional procedure  2
Burn (treatment-related)  2
Failure to perform test(s) for which patient was
  admitted, preventing diagnosis and complicating care   2
Total  84Therapeutics and Clinical Risk Management 2007:3(4) 629
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The “Communication” category was further examined to 
evaluate speciﬁ  c types of communication problems identiﬁ  ed 
during the case reviews (each ﬁ  le can have more than one 
type of communication issue). A common communication 
issue that occurred in cases with an AE (and a codable 
contributor to it) was a communication failure that angered 
a family during a child’s evaluation or treatment, but that 
had no apparent relevance to the adverse medical outcome 
(15 ﬁ  les). For example, these included two cases where a 
“patient was not initially informed of an AE [or its causes], 
but eventually found out.” Note that all cases in which this 
issue was identiﬁ  ed also had at least one problem that caused 
or contributed to the AE. On the other hand, communication 
problems that did appear to contribute to the AE included 
“communication failure among caregivers inside the insti-
tution” (15 ﬁ  les), “communication failure between patient 
and caregiver” (4 ﬁ  les), “communication failure among care 
givers outside the institution” (4 ﬁ  les), and “jousting among 
medical professionals” (3 ﬁ  les). 
Another question was whether causes of adverse 
outcomes clustered around certain underlying diagnoses. 
A significant portion of the risk management file 
openings involved “high risk” diagnoses. Specifically, 
16% of the children were premature, 13% had congenital 
heart disease, 11% had other congenital anomalies, 3% 
had cerebral palsy, and 2% involved trauma. In total, 
45% of risk management file openings in the review 
period carried a high risk diagnosis. The specific causes 
for adverse outcomes in each subset were evaluated. 
Premature infants (16% of cases) suffered 5 of the 10 
(50%) IV infiltrates identified in this review. No pattern 
of causes was identified for the other groups, perhaps due 
to small numbers of cases.
Discussion
The purposes of this project were to 1) use a method of 
abstracting risk management data at an AMC to identify 
common factors associated with pediatric AE’s, and 2) 
describe case characteristics that may increase risk for 
serious medical events and claims involving children. A 
previous review covering pediatric risk management ﬁ  les 
opened at the AMC between 1987–1995 had revealed 
several opportunities for improvement (Pichert et al 1997), 
and the medical center had responded over the next several 
years with several initiatives designed to create awareness 
of problem patterns (eg, via grand rounds presentations) and 
improve safety, (eg, via improved care and safety protocols, 
and targeted training). 
Therefore, in addition to identifying current issues, a 
question was whether the issues themselves had changed 
from the previous time period. Because risk management 
ﬁ  le openings still represent rare events for spotting trends, 
the AMC’s risk managers consider at least ﬁ  ve years of 
data to be most reliable (and generally persuasive). The 
periods reflected in the previous and current reviews 
were otherwise arbitrarily chosen. Communication issues, 
medication errors, and IV/central line problems stood out 
in both reviews, so remained areas of concern. Payouts and 
expenditures for pediatrics claims cost the insurer roughly 
equal amounts during the two time periods. Expenditures 
during both periods occurred in fewer than half of all cases 
reviewed; payments ranged from less than $100 to hundreds 
of thousands of dollars. These expenses included the cost 
of documentation, legal fees, expert witnesses, and settle-
ments and awards.
A commonly rated communication problem was one 
that made a family unhappy (eg, perceived rudeness or 
failure to answer questions), but had no bearing on the 
AE or its underlying cause(s). Note that in every one of 
these cases there had been an AE and a separate prob-
lem that appeared to contribute to the AE. While it is 
tempting to ignore or segregate this category because a 
particular communication problem had no direct effect on 
the adverse patient outcome, it is important to remember 
that unhappiness about communications in the face of an 
adverse outcome can contribute to decisions to sue, and 
certainly contributes to the costs of risk management. 
In a Florida survey of families’ reasons for filing suits, 
nearly one quarter cited a need for more information or 
the belief that there was a cover up (Hickson et al 1992). 
In that same study, nearly half of those filing suit felt 
that they were either misled by a doctor or that a doctor 
would not be open with them about the case. Other articles 
have suggested that at least as many medically nonvalid 
malpractice suits are filed as valid ones (Brennan et al 
1991; Studdert et al 2000; Baker 2005;). Communication 
that leaves families unhappy contributes to these numbers 
(Vincent et al 1994). Due in part to the data obtained in 
this study and similar findings in other projects (Pichert 
et al 1997; Morris et al 2003; White et al 2004, White 
et al 2005), the AMC now offers case-based instruction on 
“the how and when of communicating adverse outcomes 
and errors” (Pichert et al 2007).
Another common apparent communication failure 
involved “caregivers inside the institution.” Most dyads 
were represented in the data, including attending–attending, Therapeutics and Clinical Risk Management 2007:3(4) 630
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attending–resident, resident–resident, and resident–nurse. 
Almost half (47%) of all cases involving potential diagnosis 
or treatment problems also included faulty communication 
among caregivers, and more than half (53%) involved some 
type of communication problem. While there is no substitute 
for thoughtful, timely care, the cases we reviewed suggested 
that some apparent diagnostic and treatment problems likely 
would have been avoided if communication difﬁ  culties had 
not also been present, such as during patient handoffs or 
when a team member failed to voice a concern while care was 
proceeding (Weinger et al 2003, Weinger et al 2004).
The aviation industry has studied ways to reduce or 
eliminate the kinds of faulty communication that can result 
in AEs, and those techniques are being applied to medicine 
as a way to improve healthcare systems (Wilf-Miron et al 
2003). Health professionals’ willingness to speak up in a 
traditionally hierarchical system, and the ability of those 
higher in the chain-of-command to listen, are paramount to 
improving communication (Morey et al 2002). Due in part 
to the present data, Crew Resource Management, which is 
based on the aviation-industry team development model, has 
been deployed throughout the medical center as one strategy 
for improving professional-to-professional communications 
(France et al 2005).
Probable medication issues were associated with 
approximately one-ﬁ  fth of pediatric risk management ﬁ  les. 
Again, the current data and other medical center quality 
improvement initiatives led to integration of a computer order 
entry system with a pharmacy dose checking system and the 
results have been very promising (Potts et al 2004).
The extent to which these ﬁ  ndings generalize is unknown. 
Studies such as this must acknowledge that incident reporting 
varies among institutions, and risk managers apply different 
thresholds for opening a case ﬁ  le. Nevertheless, so long as 
risk managers receive sufﬁ  cient reports to identify common 
underlying causes of AEs, the system will have value so long 
as it is used to drive quality improvements (Firth-Cozens 
et al 2004; Vincent 2006). The more important issue is how 
such descriptive data can serve physicians, risk managers and 
administrators whose groups or institutions might have similar 
challenges. Note, however, that in a litigious environment, any 
quality improvement-related uses for these data depend upon 
their protection from legal discovery. Justifying this protection 
in turn depends upon actually using such data for identifying 
and working to overcome common causes of adverse outcomes. 
Consider, then, individual and organizational changes that may 
be worthy of discussion wherever pediatric care is delivered.
1)  Real or perceived communication failures anger families and 
thereby promote risk management activity. Identifying and 
rectifying miscommunications that, for example, lead family 
members to believe information is being withheld or that 
the family is being misled may reduce some patient/family 
dissatisfaction even in the face of an AE and, perhaps, reduce 
the number who pursue legal proceedings.
2) Poor communication among caregivers can lead to 
adverse outcomes and may frequently underlie what 
appear to be potential or alleged diagnosis and treatment 
errors. It behooves institutions to empower all caregivers, 
regardless of role on the health care team, to speak up 
when something seems not to be right.
3) Patients with high risk diagnoses account for a 
disproportionate share of risk management activity. 
While this is no particular surprise, these numbers 
reinforce the importance of promoting vigilance with 
respect to communication, technical aspects of care 
(eg, in this AMC, placing and monitoring IV lines for 
premature infants), and documentation in such cases. 
Caregivers who work with high risk patients may beneﬁ  t 
from targeted education and feedback in these areas.
4)  Risk management ﬁ  les provide a rich data source for analyzing 
adverse outcomes. “Near misses” may offer an even better 
source were they to be systematically reported and analyzed. 
User-friendly error reporting systems may help generate 
sufﬁ  cient data to more quickly and clearly see patterns of 
system failures. To that end, the AMC has implemented 
an online reporting system. A secure web-based system 
accessible from any medical center computer terminal allows 
employees, without regard to position, to report concerns. The 
system’s intent is to capture data as early as possible, allow 
early error pattern recognition, permit corrections, and avoid 
poor outcomes that might otherwise have occurred.
The process of aggregating and coding risk management ﬁ  les 
can be used by other institutions to help understand underlying 
causes of adverse outcomes. We believe that this process has 
value because it engages personnel in quality improvement, and 
it de-emphasizes a culture of blame. The cause-effect analysis 
process can be taught in continuing medical education programs 
(Hain et al 2003) in order to help medical staffs understand how 
underlying systems problems—not just individual physician 
failures—can affect outcomes. Another valuable aspect of the 
process is that it provides both data and anecdotes for “closing 
the feedback loop” by reporting the ﬁ  ndings back to the staff. 
Only after the personnel in a medical area are made aware of the 
problems can they actively engage in ﬁ  nding solutions. Therapeutics and Clinical Risk Management 2007:3(4) 631
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